Monday, July 31, 2017

Private Employment Agencies (Amendment) Bill 2017 - Sneaking in 'contractor for labour' system? Local Worker suffers?

Private Employment Agencies (Amendment) Bill 2017 is now before the Parliament - A close perusal will see that the proposed amendments are detrimental to workers are trade unions...it seems to be re-enforcing the 'contractor for labour' scheme..., and its impact to local workers may be serious..

The dangers of the contractor for labour scheme (in brief):-

1 - The labour supplier('contractor for labour') supplies to employers that need workers for their workplace their 'own employees' - rather than supplying workers, who will become employees of the workplace (factories, offices, companies) that they will be working.
2 - Being 'non-employees' of the factories or workplace they are really working at, these 'non employee'( ) will not be able to enjoy the benefits of employees through existing Collective Bargaining Agreements, who are union members at the workplace. The direct impact to to the workers(employees) of the particular workplace is that their ability to 'bargain' for better rights and better working conditions is significantly weakened. Unions representing workers at a particular workplace lose their power to bargain and get better rights for their union members. Note Malaysia places NO LIMITS to the number of 'non-employees' that can be utilized in the workforce of a particular workplace - nothing stopping employers of workplace from reducing their employees - and simply just using these 'non-employees' supplied by contractors for labour. This would result in the end of Trade Unions - and great injustice to worker(union members). Laws must be created to ensure all workers at a workplace are employees of that workplace, hence able to form unions and get better rights and working conditions from their employers.
3 - Being non-employees(these supplied workers) can also be discriminated - Wages, Annual Leave, Worker Rights, Promotions and Wage Increments, etc... The Agreements with the 'labour suppliers - the contractors for labour' is for the supply of a certain number of workers, and the Workplace employers pay directly to the labour supplier who then pays their own employees directly - of course, after taking a certain percentage.
4 - The Malaysian Trade Union Congress(MTUC), trade unions and civil society groups have been calling for the abolition of this 'contractor for labour system' insisting that all workers at any workplace must be direct employees of the factory/workplace employers. One point made was that we should use the Private Employment Agencies, who find employers for workers looking for employment, and find employees for Employers needing workers - a service provided for a one off stipulated fee. The new proposed amendment changes the role of Private Employment Agencies - trying to transform them into 'Contractors for Labour' - giving them to supply their 'own employees' - not simply supplying workers, one accepted shall be employees of the employer of the workplaces. Sneaky amendments...????




How is the new amendment trying to do this?

First, it changes the very definition of the 'private employment agency'..

The now existing definition is 
"private employment agency" means-

(a) an employment agency conducted with a view to profit, that is to say, any person, company, institution, agency or other organisation which acts as intermediary for the purpose of procuring employment for a worker or supplying a worker for an employer with a view to deriving either directly or indirectly any pecuniary or other material advantage from either employer or worker; the expression does not include newspapers or other publications unless they are published wholly or mainly for the purpose of acting as intermediaries between employers and workers;

(b) an employment agency not conducted with a view to profit, that is to say, the placing services of any company, institution, agency or other organisation which, though not conducted with a view to derive any pecuniary or other material advantage, levies from either employer or worker from the above service an entrance fee, a periodical contribution or any other charge;

The proposed amendments...



(a) by substituting for the definition of “private employment agency” the following definition:

‘ “private employment agency” means a body corporate which is incorporated under the Companies Act 2016 [Act 777] and is granted a licence under this Act to carry on recruiting activity;’;

(i) by inserting after the definition of “private employment agency” the following definition:

‘ “recruiting” means activities which have been carried on by any person, including advertising activities, as intermediaries between an employer and a job seeker to—
(a) offer to look for an employment, offer an employment or obtain an employment, for a job seeker; or
(b) offer to look for an employee, offer an employee or obtain an employee, for an employer;’...
Well, here you see it - "offer an employee" - when they should be offering "a worker" - see the old definition that was clear. By using the word "employee", it allows the 'private employment agency' to provide their own employees - instead of workers that will be employed by the employer of the work place. Go read the Amendment Bill, found in the Parliament's website 

When an employer of a workplace signs an agreement with a labour supplier(contractor for labour) it is usually for the supply of an unnamed number of workers, where the rate of payment depends also on the number of hours of work done(including a different rate if work done is overtime ad/or work on a rest day or public holiday). It is the 'contractor for labour' that pays his own employees - Guess what, they will not pay their 'employees' the full sum paid by the employer of the workplace to them(the labour supplier) - so profit from workers supplied continues to role in for so long as their 'employees' are working for the workplace employer.

So, is it justified that they now get to charge 'one month wages' for supplying an employee to the employer of the workplace? Well, that is in the new amendment - see the proposed new Schedule 1, 2nd Table - (b) Placement Fees - item (iii) -Non-citizen employee who is employed within Malaysia. Does this mean, they cannot still collect the month percentage of profits from the amount paid by the employer of workplaces to them? No mention, so this means, that it is additional payment by migrant workers? Does this mean that this is the maximum they can charge 'foreign workers' for all matters related to recruitment? Not very clear...

See also item (i) and (ii) of the same table - see there the word 'job seeker' is used.. not 'employee' as used in para (iii)


(i) Job seeker who is employed within Malaysia
(ii)Job seeker who is employed outside Malaysia
Item (iii) reads as follows - 'Non-citizen employee who isemployed within Malaysia

 Looking at the proposed amendments, it seems that the contractor for 'labour system' will only apply to 'foreigners'(migrant workers) and not local workers - and this is good, if true. At present, the supplied employees include both foreign and local workers...So, no more 'outsourced'(the common term used for this employees of contractors for labour supplied to work in other employer's workplaces)

Malaysia has still failed to indicate what is the employer's obligation for 'employee's supplied by the 'contractor for labour'? None. If this 'contractor for labour' system is to continue, then there must be clear provisions in law as to what is the employer obligations of the supplier, and what is the 'employer obligations' of employers who use these supplied 'employees'? 

Remember a 'supplied employee' of another, and not an employee of the workplace really have no rights to demand better rights or better working conditions from the workplace employer. Once 'supplied', most of these 'employees of the supplier' really is under total control of the employer of the workplace ...BUT No Right to Complain? No Right To Ask For Better Rights? Well, this is so wrong....

Is there a discrimination against Local Workers?

Well, the fee that the 'Private Employment Agency' gets for the placement of a local worker "job seeker' is just 25% of the basic wages for the 1st month's wages... For a local worker, earning minimum wage of RM1,000 - the Private Employment Agency gets only RM250-00 (But wait, if the worker is put on probation by the new workplace employer, the 25% is even a lesser amount)

Now, if it was a migrant worker 'employee' - they get 1 month's wages > So guess what, it is more profitable to deal with migrant workers - they get more...so will they bother with 'local' workers - maybe the more highly paid local workers, but not the 'minimum wage' workers....

Now, for the migrant worker - they are listed as 'non-citizen employee' - so they will remain as employees of the Private Employment Agencies(now becoming a 'contractor for labour') - and the monthly profits(income from the sweat and efforts of the supplied worker) will continue to roll in... Wow, better to just deal with the 'non-citizen employee'...rather than local workers...

Hence, Local Workers will suffer - private employment agencies may no longer be interested in 'local workers' looking for employment???

Remember that Private Employment Agencies is to HELP workers find jobs, and Employers to find workers ... Will they be playing that role anymore especially for local workers? For such employment agencies helping local workers, it should be made easy to form such companies - as they help Malaysian workers find jobs...

What about Permanent Residents - should they not be treated differently, and not lumped into the same category of 'non-citizen employees'? Should they not be treated as better than foreign worker? Remeber PR status is usually given to spouses of Malaysians - and now both spouses really need to work to survice in Malaysia...

There may be other things wrong with the proposed amendments being tabled about the Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 - so look at these amendments seriously..

Has our members of Parliament, Senators and/or trade unions even noticed what is happening? Have they been distracted with many other matters like 1MDB, etc -- I have not looked at the Hansard to see whether there were even serious questions raised and points made...

I must say that I just became aware of this - sadly, Media also seems to have not highlighted much on the implications of the proposed changes...
 
Recommendation(at the moment):-

1.With regard to placement fees within Malaysia, which will affect most Malaysian workers, which is now "Not more than 25% of the basic wages for the first monthly wages" - it really should be increased to at least be RM500 or RM1,000 - Maybe the new wordings could be ""Not more than 25% of the basic wages for the first monthly wages, or RM1,000, whichever is more" Maybe, the government should pay half(RM500) of this with regard low-waged local workers - as, the Private Employment Agency is really helping our local workers find jobs. An 'incentive' may be the right thing for every local worker helped to find a new job.
 
2.Keep the Private Employment Agencies for the purpose of helping workers find employment with employers of workplaces that need employees, and help employers find worker they could employ. Private Employment Agencies should not be transformed into 'contractors for labour'. Fees chargeable must be a one time fee, payable by the employer.
 
3. For migrant workers, Private Employment Agencies, may also be entitled to charge employers, all the other expenses incurred in bringing in the migrant workers.
 
4.  PR holders should be differentiated from migrant workers, especially PR holders who are spouses of Malaysians, they should be charged the same rate as local workers or maybe slightly higher say -  "Not more than 25% of the basic wages for the first monthly wages, or RM1,500, whichever is more" All spouses of Malaysians should be accorded PR status, with 3 months of the marriage being registered in Malaysia. Divorce or separation could be a condition for the revoking of PR status. However, if there are children, who are Malaysians, then rightly PR status should be retained especially if the said parent and children chose to remain in Malaysia.
 
 






 
 

Sunday, July 30, 2017

UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary - Chief Justice and imminent 'judicial crisis'?

Independence of the Malaysian Judiciary - it all depends on 2 men, 


 

1) YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif, the current Chief Justice of the Federal Court, which was to end on 3rd August 2017, was to be extended for a further three(3) years beginning 4th August 2017.

2) YAA Tan Sri Dato Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin, the current President of the Court of Appeal, whose terms was to expire on 27th September 2017, was extended for a further two(2) years beginning 28th September.

 

If YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif remain the Chief Justice of the Federal Court beyond 3/8/2017 - then 'security of tenure' a safeguard to ensure judicial independence is lost..

Security of tenure - From the date of appointment of a judge, he assured of his 'tenure' which in Malaysia should end on his retirement at 66 years. If the tenure can then be 'extended' by some other (Prime Minister/Chief Justice/etc...) then that is the end of 'security of tenure' - the last date must be a fixed date (cannot be extended by anyone)...

12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.- UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary...

Remember, that

2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Why special treatment - to extend their term for 3 and 2 years respectively? Was there 'improper influences', 'inducements' or   ...direct of indirect.... from any quarter for any reason? Who has the power to 'extend term beyond retirement'...and/or 'to keep them in the same position held' - Prime Minister, Chief Justice of the Federal Court...

So, please...please YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif and YAA Tan Sri Dato Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin, please refuse the extension of term...and do retire on 3/8/2017 for the good of Malaysia and for the independence of the Judiciary...

This is my opinion.


See related posts:- 

Chief Justice, even after retirement, for 3 more years? Wrong or Right?

4 Ogos - 'krisis badan kehakiman' jika YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus kekal 'Chief Justice' untuk 3 tahun?

Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary


Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to
6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985

Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, inter alia , their determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination, 
Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in particular the principles of equality before the law, of the presumption of innocence and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, 
Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those rights, and in addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further guarantees the right to be tried without undue delay, 
Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying those principles and the actual situation
Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country should be inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into reality, 
Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at enabling judges to act in accordance with those principles, 
Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens, 
Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to include among its priorities the elaboration of guidelines relating to the independence of judges and the selection, professional training and status of judges and prosecutors, 
Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to the role of judges in relation to the system of justice and to the importance of their selection, training and conduct, 
The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to lay judges, where they exist. 
Independence of the judiciary 
1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. 
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law. 
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law. 
5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. 
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected. 
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions. 
Freedom of expression and association
8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence.
Qualifications, selection and training
10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.
Conditions of service and tenure
11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.
12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.
13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience. 
14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. 
Professional secrecy and immunity 
15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters.
16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.
Discipline, suspension and removal
17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.
18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.
19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.

20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.

Saturday, July 29, 2017

4 Ogos - 'krisis badan kehakiman' jika YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus kekal 'Chief Justice' untuk 3 tahun?

TARIKH AKHIR TEMPOH PERKHIDMATAN HAKIM MESTI PASTI - TARIKH BERSARA - 66 TAHUN. Jika tempoh ini boleh dilanjutkan untuk hakim terpilih, tetapi bukan semua hakim, habis sudah persepsi 'kebebasan kehakiman'....Adakah lanjutan diberikan kerana hakim ini tidak akan membuat keputusan bercanggah dengan pendirian Perdana Menteri, atau orang lain yang ada kuasa melanjutkan tempoh perkhidmatan hakim? Jika Ketua Hakim menerima perlanjutan tempuh perkhidmatan selama 3 tahun lagi selepas tamat tempuh perkhidmatan pada 3 Ogos 2017...ia akan menjejaskan persepsi 'kebebasan hakim' di Malaysia...





Badan kehakiman dan hakim yang bebas, yang boleh mendengar dan membuat keputusan tanpa dipengaruhi oleh Perdana Menteri, Ketua Hakim atau hakim lain, atau mana-mana pihak lain adalah amat perlu...

Badan kehakiman adalah 'check and balance' perlu kepada 2 cabang kerajaan yang lain, iaitu Badan Perundangan(Parlimen) dan Badan Eksekutif(Perdana Menteri, Kabinet dan kerajaan).

Rakyat berhak memulakan tindakan guaman terhadap Perdana Menteri, Menteri dan kerajaan Malaysia, dan yang akan memutuskan siapa menang atau kalah adalah hakim dan Mahkamah. Jika hakim dan badan kehakiman tidak bebas, iaitu terpaksa ikut 'arahan' atau posisi Perdana Menteri, Menteri atau badan kerajaan, bagaimana keadilan boleh dicapai? Hakim dan Mahkamah tidak akan mendapat kepercayaan rakyat atau pihak lain sebagai tempat dimana mereka akan mendapatkan keadilan.

Kebebasan kehakiman adalah amat penting, dan oleh kerana itu ada beberapa perkara perlu untuk memastikan 'kebebasan ini'. 

'Security of tenure'(ketetapan tempoh perkhidmatan) adalah satu daripada cara yang terpenting memastikan kebebasan ini... Hakim, setelah dilantik menjadi hakim, tidak perlu lagi risau bahawa mereka kena ditamatkan perkhidmatan jika membuat keputusan Mahkamah menentang kerajaan (PM, Menteri, Polis dan mana-mana badan/institusi kerajaan). Hakim akan terus menjadi hakim sampai umur persaraan, yang ditetapkan Perlembagaan Persekutuan, iaitu sampai mencapai umur 66 tahun. Tempuh perkhidmatan boleh diakhiri jika hakim perseorangan sendiri letak jawatan, tetapi memang sukar sekali untuk 'buang kerja' mana-mana hakim di Malaysia.

'Security of tenure'(ketetapan tempoh perkhidmatan) akan menjadi lemah dan/atau tidak berkesan sekiranya tempoh perkhidmatan hakim boleh dilanjutkan melampaui umur persaraan oleh mana-mana pihak, sama ada Yang Di Pertuan Agung, Perdana Menteri, Ketua Hakim atau mana-mana pihak lain...Jika ada kemungkinan sebegini untuk melanjutkan tempuh perkhidmatan hakim, adakah hakim tersebut mungkin membuat keputusan dan penghakiman di Mahkamah secara bebas - atau adakah beliau akan membuat keputusan dan penghakiman berpihak kepada(atau saperti yang dihasratkan) pihak yang ada kuasa(atau pengaruh) melanjutkan tempoh perkhidmatan hakim berkenaan? 

Perlanjutan tempuh perkhidmatan hakim yang diterima oleh beberapa hakim tetapi bukan semua juga melemahkan 'security of tenure'. Justeru, peruntukkan yang membenarkan lanjutan 6 bulan untuk hakim yang bersara juga adalah tidak wajar - dan harus dikeluarkan. Tarikh akhir tempoh perkhidmatan mesti pasti, dan terpakai untuk semua hakim - dan tarikh ini haruslah tarikh persaraan bila mencapai umur 66 tahun.

Dalam isu keadilan, apa yang perlu dijaga bukan sahaja hakikat, tetapi juga persepsi umum. "Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done". Seseorang hakim mungkin akan terus bertindak bebas, dan mengeluarkan penghakiman adil sapertimana diperlu bebas daripada pengaruh luar. Tetapi, jika ada yang boleh melanjutkan tempuh perkhidmatan kamu, tidakkah anda akan cuba melakukan kerja, yang tidak akan mengugat perhubungan anda dengan mereka yang ada kuasa melanjutkan tempuh anda? 

Malaysia kini di ambang satu 'Krisis Badan Kehakiman'(Judicial Krisis). Ketua Hakim Negara akan habis tempuh perkhidmatan pada 3 Ogos 2017, tetapi menurut satu kenyataan media Pejabat Perdana Menteri, tempuh perkhidmatan beliau akan dilanjutkan selama 3 tahun selepas itu. Tempuh Presiden Mahkamah Rayuan, yang akan akhir pada 27 September 2017, akan dilanjutkan selepas itu untuk tempuh 2 tahun.

Isu ini bertambah serius kerana ini bukan isu hakim biasa, tetapi 2 orang hakim yang merupakan ketua Badan Kehakiman di Malaysia.

Apakah yang akan dilakukan oleh  YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif(Chief Justice of the Federal Court) dan YAA Tan Sri Dato Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin(President of the Court of Appeal)? Sehingga kini, kedua-dua hakim tersebut nampaknya tidak lagi menyatakan apa-apa. Harapan saya adalah, kedua hakim tersebut akan menolak perlantikan dan perlanjutan tempuh berkenaan, demi mempertahankan kebebasan badan kehakiman - demi Malaysia. 

PERLANTIKAN YANG DIPERTUAN AGUNG?

Ramai yang masih tidak sedar bahawa Yang DiPertuan Agung sebenarnya tidak lagi ada kuasa bertindak secara sendiri berasaskan budibicara sendiri. Yang DiPertuan Agung HARUS ikut nasihat orang perseorangan (biasa Perdana Menteri). In jelas sekali jika dilihat Artikel 40 dalam Perlembagaan negara ...
Article 40(1A) 
In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or federal law, where the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is to act in accordance with advice, on advice, or after considering advice, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall accept and act in accordance with such advice.’
Di dalam isu perlantikan Hakim, kuasa memberi 'nasihat' di tangan Perdana Menteri
Article 122B(1) 
 ‘The Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High Courts and (subject to Article 122c) the other judges of the Federal Court, of the Court of Appeal and of the High Courts shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers.
'after consulting...' bererti bahawa PM kena 'consult' tetapi tidak perlu ikut apa yang dikatakan pihak yang dia perlu 'consult'

Justeru, Perdana Menteri ada kuasa dalam isu perlantikan hakim - termasuk perlantikkan Ketua Hakim, dsb..

Yang DiPertuan Agung hanya ada kuasa bertindak sendiri, tanpa perlu menurut nasihat Perdana Menteri atau orang lain hanya dalam beberapa keadaan sahaja - 4 yang dinyatakan secara khusus, dan keadaan lain yang dinyatakan dalam Perlembagaan - dipercayai mesti jelas menyatakan sedemikian. Dalam isu perlantikan Perdana Menteri pun, ada syarat yang menyatakan calun tersebut mesti mempunyai majoriti ahli dewan rakyat...justeru, kuasa lantikan Perdana Menteri pun sesuka hati...

Article 40(2) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may act in his discretion in the performance of the following functions, that is to say:

(a) the appointment of a Prime Minister;
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of Parliament;
(c) the requisition of a meeting of the Conference of Rulers concerned solely with the privileges, position, honours and dignities of Their Royal Highnesses, and any action at such a meeting,
and in any other case mentioned in this Constitution.
Sedih kita hilang seorang Hakim yang baik yang masih mampu menjalankan tugas...tetapi mesti bersara bila sampai tarikh persaraan 66 tahun. Jika Perlembagaan sudah dipinda dan tarikh persaraan di naik kepada 70 tahun atau  80 tahun ...itu boleh.Pada masa ini, hakim mesti bersara bila capai 66 tahun...

Saya berpendapat, bahawa tempuh 6 bulan tambahan dalam Perlembagaan pun harus dikeluarkan. Bukan semua hakim mendapatkan lanjutan 6 bulan ini - adakah mereka yang pro-PM atau pro- orang lain dapat, dan yang bersikap adil tak dapat? Ini menjadi tanda tanya...Seharusnya tak ada peruntukan mengenai 'tempoh perkhidmatan hakim' yang harus membolehkan soalan sebegini....Justeru, perlu satu tarikh tamat perkhidmatan untuk semua hakim - 66 tahun.

Tuesday July 25, 2017
07:43 PM GMT+8
Md Raus is to remain as Chief Justice for three more years following his appointment as an additional judge of the Federal Court while Zulkefli, who was appointed as an additional judge of the Federal Court, will remain Court of Appeal president for two more years. — Bernama picMd Raus is to remain as Chief Justice for three more years following his appointment as an additional judge of the Federal Court while Zulkefli, who was appointed as an additional judge of the Federal Court, will remain Court of Appeal president for two more years. — Bernama pic KOTA KINABALU, July 25 — Lawyers in Sabah and Sarawak have followed their peninsula counterparts in raising constitutional questions on the appointment of the country’s two top judges and urged the judges in question to reconsider accepting the posts.

Sabah Law Society (SLS) president Brenndon Keith Soh and the Advocates Association of Sarawak (AAS) president Ranbir Singh Sangla suggested that extending the tenure of both Tan Sri Md Raus Sharif as Chief Justice and Tan Sri Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin as Court of Appeal president was unconstitutional and presented a negative image of the country’s judiciary.

They said they did not doubt the characters and capabilities of the two nor the constitutional powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

“However, it is clear that the timing and mode of the appointments and or the extensions certainly gives rise to the various issues raised above in this statement and specifically on the public perception and confidence in the judiciary,” Soh and Ranbir said in a joint statement today.

They urged the two top judges to reconsider remaining in office when their controversial appointments might affect public confidence in the judiciary.

They pointed to Article 122(1A) of the Federal Constitution, which concern the powers of the Federal Court, as cause for their concern.

They asked if the appointments of the duo had considered, among others, whether such appointments can be made when there are sufficient judges of the Federal Court.

They also pointed out that the appointments were not made via the Judicial Appointments Commission established under the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009.

“Furthermore, there are unanswered questions as to why other competent Federal Court Judges have not been considered suitable to be appointed as chief justice or president of the court of appeal,” Soh and Ranbir said.

They said that the public confidence in the judiciary must be given the highest importance, citing from the United Kingdom’s Select Committee on the Constitution: “It is important not only that the judiciary act independently, but that they are seen to do so.  This principle also extends to the appointments process”.

Md Raus was scheduled to retire on August 3 and Zulkefli on September 27 this year upon reaching 66 years of age, but the Prime Minister’s Office had earlier this month announced an extension of his tenure.

Md Raus would remain Chief Justice for three more years following his appointment as an additional judge of the Federal Court while Zulkefli, who was appointed as an additional judge of the Federal Court, would remain Court of Appeal president for two more years.

The Malaysian Bar had described Raus and Zulkefli’s extensions as "blatantly unconstitutional" while former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad said the extension had “all the earmarks of favouritism”. - Malay Mail, 25/7/2017

Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary


Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to
6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985

Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, inter alia , their determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination, 

Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in particular the principles of equality before the law, of the presumption of innocence and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, 

Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those rights, and in addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further guarantees the right to be tried without undue delay, 

Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying those principles and the actual situation, 

Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country should be inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into reality, 

Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at enabling judges to act in accordance with those principles, 

Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens, 

Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to include among its priorities the elaboration of guidelines relating to the independence of judges and the selection, professional training and status of judges and prosecutors, 

Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to the role of judges in relation to the system of justice and to the importance of their selection, training and conduct, 

The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to lay judges, where they exist. 

Independence of the judiciary 

1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. 

2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 

3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law. 

4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law. 

5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. 

6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected. 

7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions. 

Freedom of expression and association

8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence.

Qualifications, selection and training

10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.

Conditions of service and tenure

11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.

12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.

13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience. 

14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. 

Professional secrecy and immunity 

15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters.

16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Discipline, suspension and removal

17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.

18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.

19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.


20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.

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THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002) 

Preamble

WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge.

WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions.

WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice.

WHEREAS a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to fulfil their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law.

WHEREAS public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society.

WHEREAS it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.

WHEREAS the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of high standards of judicial conduct lies with the judiciary in each country.

AND WHEREAS the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary are designed to secure and promote the independence of the judiciary, and are addressed primarily to States.

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.

Value 1: INDEPENDENCE

Principle:
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

Application:
1.1 A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
1.2 A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which the judge has to adjudicate.
1.3 A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.
1.4 In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
1.5 A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
1.6 A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Value 2: IMPARTIALITY

Principle:
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Application:
2.1 A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice.
2.2 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
2.3 A judge shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself as to minimise the occasions on which it will be necessary for the judge to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
2.4 A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
2.5 A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
2.5.1 the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
2.5.2 the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; or
2.5.3 the judge, or a member of the judge's family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy:
Provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.

Value 3: INTEGRITY

Principle:
Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.

Application:
3.1 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
3.2 The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Value 4: PROPRIETY

Principle:
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.

Application:
4.1 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities.
4.2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
4.3. A judge shall, in his or her personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practise regularly in the judge's court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality.
4.4 A judge shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of the judge's family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
4.5 A judge shall not allow the use of the judge's residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients or other members of the legal profession.
4.6 A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
4.7 A judge shall inform himself or herself about the judge's personal and fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of the judge's family.
4.8 A judge shall not allow the judge's family, social or other relationships improperly to influence the judge's judicial conduct and judgment as a judge.
4.9 A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge's family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.
4.10 Confidential information acquired by a judge in the judge's judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by the judge for any other purpose not related to the judge's judicial duties.
4.11 Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, a judge may:
4.11.1 write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.2 appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.3 serve as a member of an official body, or other government commission, committee or advisory body, if such membership is not inconsistent with the perceived impartiality and political neutrality of a judge;or
4.11.4 engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
4.12 A judge shall not practise law whilst the holder of judicial office.
4.13 A judge may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organisations representing the interests of judges.
4.14 A judge and members of the judge's family, shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
4.15 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge's influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with his or her duties or functions.
4.16 Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, a judge may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

Value 5: EQUALITY

Principle:
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

Application:
5.1 A judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes ("irrelevant grounds").
5.2 A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
5.3 A judge shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
5.4 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge's influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
5.5 A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

Value 6: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Principle:
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

Application:
6.1 The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
6.2 A judge shall devote the judge's professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.
6.3 A judge shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the judge's knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
6.4 A judge shall keep himself or herself informed about relevant developments of international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
6.5 A judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
6.6 A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to the judge's influence, direction or control.
6.7 A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.

IMPLEMENTATION

By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions.

DEFINITIONS

In this statement of principles, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:

Court staff " includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks."
Judge " means any person exercising judicial power, however designated."
Judge's family " includes a judge's spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's household.”
Judge's spouse" includes a domestic partner of the judge or any other person of either sex in a personal relationship with the judge.”