Showing posts with label Judiciary and Courts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judiciary and Courts. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 01, 2017

Jika Raus kekal jadi ketua Badan Kehakiman, PM Najib pun boleh lantik ramai Hakim hari terakhir beliau ada kuasa?

Perdana Menteri Najib pun boleh pada hari terakhir menjadi Perdana Menteri, pun boleh melantik seberapa ramai Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan dan Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan....dan selepas itu Yang Di Pertuan Agung TERPAKSA melakukan sapertimana dinasihati Perdana Menteri - tak kira UMNO-BN sudah tewas dalam PRU 14, dan ada kerajaan gabungan parti pembangkang dan Perdana Menteri Baru...



Inilah apa ertinya jika  YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif(Chief Justice of the Federal Court)  terus kekal sebagai Hakim selepas 3/8/2017 - dan terus memegang jawatan Ketua Hakim Negara selepas tarikh tersebut untuk tiga(3) tahun yang akan datang...

Justeru - 4 OGOS 2017 merupakan tarikh yang sangat penting untuk semua rakyat Malaysia...





Apa yang berlaku dalam kes YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus?

Pada tarikh terakhir terma Ketua Hakim yang lalu, beliau telah menasihatkan Yang DiPertuan Agung untuk melantik ' YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus bin Sharif' sebagai 'hakim tambahan' berkuatkuasa mulai 4/8/2017 untuk terma 3 tahun.




Yang DiPertuan Agung telah mengikut 'nasihat' Ketua Hakim tersebut dan seterus telah buat saperti mana dinasihati...


Yang DiPertuan Agung sebenarnya tidak ada kuasa untuk melakukan selain daripada apa yang yang telah dinasihatinya oleh pihak tertentu (biasanya Perdana Menteri, dan dalam kes ini 'Ketua Hakim Negara'... ini jelas daripada Artikel 40 Perlembagaan Persekutuan...

Article 40(1A) 
In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or federal law, where the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is to act in accordance with advice, on advice, or after considering advice, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall accept and act in accordance with such advice.’

Kuasa pemberian 'advise'(nasihat) kepada YDP Agung untuk melantik 'hakim tambahan' adalah ditangan "Chief Justice of the Federal Court'...

Jangan lupa nahawa PM Najib yang ada kuasa menentukan siapa jadi Hakim...nasihat beliau harus dituruti YDP Agung 

Article 122B(1) 
 ‘The Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High Courts and (subject to Article 122c) the other judges of the Federal Court, of the Court of Appeal and of the High Courts shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers.

Justeru, apa yang berlaku pada Jumaat (4/8/2017) adalah sangat penting kepada masa depan negara...

Kalau 'Chief Justice of the Federal Court' dapat memberi nasihat pada hari terakhir sebelum beliau habis tempoh perkhidmatan - ini bermakna bahawa PM pun boleh buat perkara yang sama ...

Implikasi sangat besar...


Lihat post terdahulu:-

4 Ogos - 'krisis badan kehakiman' jika YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus kekal 'Chief Justice' untuk 3 tahun?

Chief Justice, even after retirement, for 3 more years? Wrong or Right? peruntukkan Perlembangan mengenai hakim, perlantikan hakim...badan kehakiman boleh dilihat dalam post ini.

UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary - Chief Justice and imminent 'judicial crisis'? - ini bukan sahaja isu Perlembagaan dan/atau tafsiran Perlembagaan, tetapi lebih penting adalah isu PRINSIP - di sini kita melihat piawai antarabangsa yang juga terpakai di Malaysia, sebuah negara dalam Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu..

BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

 

 

 

BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT


 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.

Judges - Independence, Impartiality, Integrity, Proprietary, Equality, Competence and Diligence > These are the values that judges must have and/or promote - These are the values set out in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct - and for each VALUE, the principle is laid out, and several 'Applications' are also there for guidance..

See related posts:-

4 Ogos - 'krisis badan kehakiman' jika YAA Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Md Raus kekal 'Chief Justice' untuk 3 tahun?

Chief Justice, even after retirement, for 3 more years? Wrong or Right? -relevant Constituion provisions considered

UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary - Chief Justice and imminent 'judicial crisis'?


Below, I consider some of words/phrases and sentences from the Bangalore principles, but do read the Bangalore Principles laid out in full below...

INDEPENDENCE








'...free of any extraneous influences, inducements, ..., direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason....'

Well, is not an extension of 3 years, beyond the end of term of office an 'inducement' - Who provided this inducement 'the now former Chief Justice of the Federal Court...?
Well, is not a being able to hold the position of 'Chief Justice of the Federal Court, beyond 3/8/2017 for another THREE(3) years an "inducement" - Who provided this inducement - Prime Minister Najib?

Who are some of these 'any quarter' - Well, the Bangalore principle not just talk about the executive, Legislature but also " a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues'

A judge may be INDEPENDENT - but that is unsufficient, because what matters also is the perception of others...
 
- A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.

- A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Note that this DUTY is on the Judge personally - The appointments were made by others....so, now the question is what will Tan Sri Raus do. 

Accept because the appointment is made by the YDP Agung? He has the option to REFUSE the appointment - and that is what he must do, in my opinion....

IMPARTIALITY 

" his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

INTEGRITY




A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
3.2 The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
 
PROPRIETY
 
"...avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality."

 EQUALITY

'not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge's family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
 
A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.

Now, here Tan Sri Raus is not only a JUDGE - but he is also the Head of the Judiciary - and this appointment' as an additional judge for a 3 year term beyond the end of his term, and the 'appointment' to be the Chief Justice of the Federal Court for this added 3 years is unprecedented in Malaysia. 

A lot is on his shoulders - and what he will do really matters....it will have a very serious impact on people's perception...

To ensure the INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, tenure must be fixed and definite, and that should be the Retirement Age of 66. Any extension of term of office, more so when it is given to some, but not all Judges impacts this 'Independence'...

As it is, there is already much concern with transfers and elevation of Judges - there is a call that these powers be made more 'independent'...

Our Federal Constitution, in my opinion, still have flaws and 'gaps' - and there needs to be necessary amendments to ensure that judges and the judiciary are "independent', and cannot be influenced directly and/or indirectly by any persons...especially those with the power to grant extensions to tenure... {UN principles clearly state 'mandatory' retirement - in other words, a fixed term in office ...known from the date of appointment.

One thing that must be looked into is increasing the 'PENSIONS' of Judges. While a person is judge, he gets a reasonably high salary...and further financial and money's worth allowances and benefits - which may be even equivalent or more than the salary. But, when a judge retires, there is no guarantee that his pension will be 50% of his salary (which, even if 50%, will be really just about 25% or less of his total income(salary plus allowance plus benefits). The formula that calculates judge's pension considers the number of years a judge is on the bench... PERSONALLY, I am of the opinion that judges pension should be equivalent to last drawn salary(less allowances/benefits).

'COOLING OFF PERIOD' - Judges, when they retire, should not be taking up any other paid positions - be it, as a Consultant in some Law Firm, Director in some Corporation, Position in Government or government bodies, etc... If he/she does, the question may arise as to 'why' - was it a 'benefit' for services previously rendered? It is something to think about...

AG Apandi Ali - his sudden resignation as a Federal Court Judge at 65, and the taking up of the position of AG should be a matter of concern.

Now, this extension of term in Office of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, and also the President of the Court of Appeal is also a matter of concern...

Many are considering legal extension, if the Chief Justice continues in office beyond 3rd August, but will the Malaysian Judiciary be seen as 'Independent' in dealing with these cases? Furthermore, judges will 'know' that their decision will impact on their own Head/s of the Judiciary, for the nezt 3/2 years. Will a judgment result in declaring the appointments null and void - forcing the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the President of the Court of Appeal, having to leave their office, and the declaration naturally that all court judgments which they were involved in being declared null and void? It would also mean all decision made with regard to transfers and/or elevations and/or corams of Court of Appeal/Federal Court being void ab initio.A big mess indeed. Further, in the minds of judges presiding over these cases will be the concern of their own future - transfers, elevations, etc - although they should not be bothered about this and act judiciously...But judges, are also human.

Frankly for the strengthening of the independence of the Judiciary - we should be considering may be same wages/allowances/benefits irrespective of whether one is a High Court Judge, Court of Appeal Judge, Federal Court Judge or even the Chief Justice of the Federal Court. Now elevation results in wage/remuneration increasing. 

After this, we really must look at how we can strengthen and ensure the INDEPENDENCE of the Malaysian Judiciary. One consideration would be the 'Security of Tenure' - it must be fixed - the mandatory retirement age. No more possibilities of extensions of term of office, that is accorded to some but not all. Increasing retirement age must be considered - 70 may be a more reasonable age. Alternatively, we could consider 'life tenure'. 

The YDP Agung has appointed, on the advice of the previous Chief Justice of the Federal Court, and Prime Minister Najib - so, the ball is now in the court of the current Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the President of the Court of Appeal. A lot of unnecessary pressure on these 2 men, and what they do now will impact on the future of the Malaysian Judiciary. A rejection of the 'extension' would also serve as positive example to all sitting judges - the message is that values and principles matters. 

 

 


THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
 
(The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002) 
Preamble
WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as fundamental the principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge.
WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions.
WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice.
WHEREAS a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to fulfil their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law.
WHEREAS public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society.
WHEREAS it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.
WHEREAS the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of high standards of judicial conduct lies with the judiciary in each country.
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary are designed to secure and promote the independence of the judiciary, and are addressed primarily to States.
THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They are also intended to assist members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.
Value 1: INDEPENDENCE
Principle:
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Application:
1.1 A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
1.2 A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which the judge has to adjudicate.
1.3 A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.
1.4 In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
1.5 A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
1.6 A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Value 2: IMPARTIALITY
Principle:
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Application:
2.1 A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice.
2.2 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
2.3 A judge shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself as to minimise the occasions on which it will be necessary for the judge to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
2.4 A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
2.5 A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
2.5.1 the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
2.5.2 the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; or
2.5.3 the judge, or a member of the judge's family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy:
Provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
Value 3: INTEGRITY
Principle:
Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
Application:
3.1 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
3.2 The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Value 4: PROPRIETY
Principle:
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.
Application:
4.1 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities.
4.2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
4.3. A judge shall, in his or her personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practise regularly in the judge's court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality.
4.4 A judge shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of the judge's family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
4.5 A judge shall not allow the use of the judge's residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients or other members of the legal profession.
4.6 A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
4.7 A judge shall inform himself or herself about the judge's personal and fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of the judge's family.
4.8 A judge shall not allow the judge's family, social or other relationships improperly to influence the judge's judicial conduct and judgment as a judge.
4.9 A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge's family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.
4.10 Confidential information acquired by a judge in the judge's judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by the judge for any other purpose not related to the judge's judicial duties.
4.11 Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, a judge may:
4.11.1 write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.2 appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.3 serve as a member of an official body, or other government commission, committee or advisory body, if such membership is not inconsistent with the perceived impartiality and political neutrality of a judge;or
4.11.4 engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
4.12 A judge shall not practise law whilst the holder of judicial office.
4.13 A judge may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organisations representing the interests of judges.
4.14 A judge and members of the judge's family, shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
4.15 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge's influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with his or her duties or functions.
4.16 Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, a judge may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Value 5: EQUALITY
Principle:
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
Application:
5.1 A judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes ("irrelevant grounds").
5.2 A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
5.3 A judge shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
5.4 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge's influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
5.5 A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Value 6: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Principle:
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
Application:
6.1 The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
6.2 A judge shall devote the judge's professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.
6.3 A judge shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the judge's knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
6.4 A judge shall keep himself or herself informed about relevant developments of international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
6.5 A judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
6.6 A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to the judge's influence, direction or control.
6.7 A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
IMPLEMENTATION
By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions.
DEFINITIONS
In this statement of principles, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:
Court staff " includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks."
Judge " means any person exercising judicial power, however designated."
Judge's family " includes a judge's spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's household.”
Judge's spouse" includes a domestic partner of the judge or any other person of either sex in a personal relationship with the judge.”

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Najib's and BN's commitment to anti-corruption question - looking back at Eric Chia and Kasitah Kadam's judgments

Our Prime Minister Najib and the BN government over the years have been trying to convince us that they are anti-corruption, and will act against corruption and other mal-practices. Alas, it is sad that only the 'small crooks' have been targetted - not the big crooks. 

Even, if the 'big boys' are arrested, charged and tried - the government still will do the needful to ensure that they are acquitted. Prosecution sometimes just fail to present a strong case - sometimes even by not calling important witnesses, that should have been called, and hence leaving judges no choice but to acquit. Remember, once a person is charged and acquitted, he/she cannot be charged again for the same offence.

We really need laws to ensure that we can take and charge persons vested with powers to court for their actions (inaction) that was deliberate or negligent that undermined the law and/or the good of the nations. Prime Ministers who signed agreements or did things detrimental to the law, rights and justice. We need the ability to be able to charge former PMs, Ministers, Director Generals, Auditor Generals, etc -- and they should never be given immunity by reason of the fact that these were done while they held a particular office. Prosecutors who failed to call important witnesses...who failed to present a proper case... so persons charged get acquitted by reason of their actions/omissions and/or gross negligence should also be liable to the people they serve.

Remember Eric Chia and Kasitah Kadam - both were acquitted because prosecution failed to call material witnesses.

The Eric Chia case...
In his 30-page oral judgment, he went on to fault the prosecution in every aspect of the case, from the way the main charge and alternative charge were proffered right to the tendering of documents, and its failure to call crucial witnesses.
Akhtar said the most glaring setback was the prosecution’s failure to call two material witnesses, who would have been able to confirm whether payment was needed for the technical assistance agreements (TAA) signed between Perwaja Rolling Mill Development and NKK Corporation.
He said former Perwaja company secretary R.R. Durai Rajasingam, who was involved in all Perwaja’s contracts, would have known the actual contents of the TAA.
“Yet the prosecution never called him. The question is why? I see nothing to say that he would be a hostile witness or give evidence against them.”
The judge also questioned the prosecution’s reluctance to call the five Japanese witnesses, including NKK Corporation, Japan, director N. Otani, who was present at the signing of the TAA in Japan in 1993.
“I wonder whether it was the Japanese witnesses who were reluctant or the prosecution was the one reluctant to bring them here,” he said.
Akhtar also said the prosecution’s contention that the TAA was free fell flat in its face when tendering its documents at the trial as they clearly stated that the agreements would be effective upon receiving first payment.
Another document by NKK Corporation not only requested for the payment to be in a lump sum but also stated the amount.
He said the prosecution failed to lead any evidence to show fabrication of that document, which it contended.- Star, 27/6/2007, Eric Chia acquitted of CBT
Now, see the similarities in the Kasitah Gaddam's case...

Former land and cooperative development minister Tan Sri Kasitah Gaddam was acquitted and discharged by the High Court here of committing corrupt practice and cheating involving shares belonging to the Sabah Land Development Board (SLDB) in 1996.
Judge Justice Suraya Othman ruled that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case on both charges for the court to call Kasitah to enter his defence.
“The essential ingredients of both the offences of corrupt practice and cheating were not made out on the facts before the court. In the circumstances, the accused stands acquitted and discharged of both the charges against him,” Suraya said in her 74-page judgment.
Kasitah, 62, was the first Cabinet member to be charged with such crimes....
.
,,,,Kasitah had claimed trial to using his position as SLDB chairman for his financial gain by taking part in the decision to approve a proposal to sell 16.8 million shares held by the board in Sapi Plantations Sdn Bhd to Briskmark Enterprise Sdn Bhd, where he was promised 3.36 million shares in Sapi Plantations on Oct 22, 1996.
On the second charge, Kasitah was alleged to have cheated the SLDB board members by omitting to disclose the offer by PPB Oil Palms Sdn Bhd to allocate five shares of the company for each share of Sapi Plantations in the proposal by company for listing on the KLSE.
He thereby dishonestly induced them to approve the sale of 16.8 million shares held by SLDB in Sapi Plantations to Briskmark Enterprise whereas they would not have approved the sale if they had known about the offer by PPB Oil Palms.
Justice Suraya said the failure of the prosecution in not calling six board members who were present in the meeting was detrimental to the case as it had created a big gap over the question of whether the board members were actually cheated by the accused.
She also said that evidence by lawyer cum board member Catherine Yong was very damaging as she did not indicate that Kasitah had misused his position or influence her or other board members during the meeting.
Besides that, the judge said there was no element of inducement on the part of Kasitah to the board members.- Star, 13/8/2009, Kasitah freed of corruption charges
When you do not have sufficient evidence and necessary witnesses, you must never charge a person in court. And, if you fail to convict, then it is time for Malaysia a law that requires the government to pay COMPENSATION to accussed persons - to compensate their loss of liberty, their costs, etc... 

When it comes to material witnesses, it is normal practice to first record a statement by the witness usually under oath - so, even if there is a sudden change of testimony when he is called, that witness can be challenged with reference to the earlier statements  given. Such witnesses could also be charged in court...

Witness can be summoned through the issuance of subpoenas (court orders) and a failure to comply with the said order can give rise to contempt proceedings taken against such witnesses...

So, why was there a failure to call material witnesses? Was there some order...or some other intervening factor at play that wanted the said accused persons acquitted? Or was it just incompetence, negligence or inexperience on the part of the assigned prosecutors? All we can do is speculate...

See also earlier post:

Kasitah Gaddam & Eric Chia - Prosecution's failure to call witnesses - Was it just incompetence OR....?


Monday, January 16, 2012

Judges’ declaration of assets will enhance public confidence in Judiciary - but really this is insufficient to fight corruption

Declaration of assets may be one of the steps towards ensuring the independence of the Judiciary..... and maybe it should also extend to immediate family members.

But, corruption has become creative today - and it takes on different forms.... appointment as a Director of a Company or a Commissioner or into some Board or another after retirement. Maybe, it also takes the form of employment as a highly paid Consultant in some law firm. The Malaysian Bar had called before for a 'cooling off' period of three years from the date of retirement but is this enough...

What really is the problem? I believe that the problem is the salary and pension - it is too low. I believe that when judges retire, their income be it from salary or other allowances should be maintained as their pension, with maybe a steady increment thereafter to reflect inflation and increased cost of living. Note that today, judges many a times do not even receive 50% of their last drawn salary - because their pension is calculated using another formula, which takes into account the number of months they sat as judges. This is not right.

Below the Bar's statement:-


Press Release

Judges’ declaration of assets will enhance public confidence in Judiciary
The Malaysian Bar applauds the Chief Justice’s announcement that superior court judges will be required to declare their assets, as well as his reminder to judges to uphold the independence of the Judiciary and reject interference of any kind.
 
The involvement of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (“MACC”), a third party, will enhance the perception of impartiality in the verification of the declaration of assets.
 
These are important steps towards increasing public confidence in the Judiciary, which the Bar supports.


Lim Chee Wee
President
Malaysian Bar

16 Jan 2012

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Wrong for the Court of Appeal to deny leave to MP Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj

I stand for elections, and the people choose me as their Member of Parliament(MP) - but the Barisan Nasional Malaysian government just does not give me the same rights and privileges as is given to other MPs from the Barisan Nasional political parties - special funds

This is clearly going against the Federal Constitution that guarantees equality - and all MPs are entitled to equal treatment from the government - the Malaysian government. (not the BN, not the Pakatan...)  - the Malaysian people's government and these funds we are talking about are the funds of the people not the BN, or the Pakatan. 

The preferential treatment accorded to BN MPs is not only 'discriminatory' - but is also against the principles of democracy...

One MP took this matter to the Courts for a judicial determination - and whilst the High Court said it was an important matter that should be heard, our Court of Appeal said otherwise... It would have been much better if the Court of Appeal was hearing the substantive application and made a determination according to the principles of justice - but no, they just decided to avoid 'questioning' or 'reviewing' the practices of the BN government - they did not want to hear the substantive application, and then decide. They just denied permission for the application for judicial review...

Appellate court dumps Jeyakumar’s MP funds challenge

October 10, 2011

Jeyakumar complained of unsatisfactory responses to his application for constituency funds. — File pic
PUTRAJAYA, Oct 10 — The Court of Appeal today dismissed Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj’s application for a judicial review on the equitable allocation of parliamentarians’ special constituency funds.
In its ruling, the three-judge bench said the Sungai Siput MP’s contention that the distribution of lawmakers’ funds lacked consistency and transparency, were not legally enforceable or reviewable by the judiciary.

Datuk Wira Low Hop Bing, Datuk Abdul Wahab Patail and Anantham Kasinather made the ruling unanimously.

Low said Datuk Aziah Ali (then of the High Court) was erroneous in granting leave to Dr Jeyakumar for judicial review, and said there were presently no laws that allowed a challenge on the discretionary nature of the fund allocations.

On February 24, Dr Jeyakumar succeeded securing approval from the High Court for a judicial review that the allocation should be made available to all MPs equally.

Among others, he was seeking an order to compel the Implementation Co-ordination Unit director-general, Perak State Development office director and the federal government to specify who can apply for funds from the allocation.

In his application, Dr Jeyakumar said he had been applying for the allocation since 2008 but had not received a satisfactory response. - Malaysian Insider, 10/10/2011, Appellate court dumps Jeyakumar’s MP funds challenge

We must look at the grounds of decision of the Court of Appeal, but in the interim, I wii comment on what has been reported in the above report.

"MP’s contention that the distribution of lawmakers’ funds lacked consistency and transparency, were not legally enforceable or reviewable by the judiciary..." - I wonder why since that application was about practices that were discriminatory contrary to the Federal Constitution. Has our judiciary forgotten their role in a democracy - where the Courts is where one goes to challenge what is being done by the government (the executive) which is contrary to law and justice. Check and balance role and duty of the Judiciary. Is there some provision in our constitution or the law that says that we cannot go for judicial review with regard to these allocation of funds - I do not think so...

"...presently no laws that allowed a challenge on the discretionary nature of the fund allocations..." - the question really is whether there is any law that prevents such a challenge, and I do not believe that there is... No one can fathom what challenges can be made to Court, and to insist that there must be some law or other to permit such challenges specifically is just wrong.

What is being prayed for in that judicial review application is also Declarations - and rightfully the court must deal with this question and provide the necessary declaration, whether in favour of Devaraj or not. It is not right to just avoid dealing with Declarations sought by denying leave. 

Below is the decision of the High Court Judge that granted leave for a full judicial review, which the Court of Appeal seem to have reversed....


DR MICHAEL JEYAKUMAR DEVARAJ v. KETUA PENGARAH UNIT PENYELARASAN PELAKSANAAN DI JABATAN PERDANA MENTERI, PENGARAH PEJABAT PEMBANGUNAN NEGERI PERAK & GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA
HIGH COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
AZIAH ALI J
[APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. R1-25-474-2010]
25 FEBRUARY 2011

JUDGMENT
Aziah Ali J:-
The Applicant is a member of Parliament ("MP") for the Sungai Siput constituency in the State of Perak. The 1st Respondent is the Director-General of the Implementation Coordination Unit ("ICU") of the Prime Minister's Department. The 2nd Respondent is the Director of the Perak State Development Office ("Pejabat Pembangunan Negeri Perak") ("PPN"). The Applicant applies for leave for judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. The Attorney General objected to the application. I dismissed the objection and granted leave. By consent there is no order as to costs.

Background
[2] Briefly in 2008, 2009 and 2010 the Applicant had made applications for funds from the Special Constituency Allowance for SMJK Shin Chung, SJK Methodist and Nurul Ihsan Orphanage and to aid the Orang Asli. In respect of the application in 2008 (exh. MJD-17) the 2nd Respondent replied that the application "tidak dapat dipertimbangkan" (exh. MJD-18). The 2nd Respondent did not respond to the Applicant's request for an explanation as to why his application could not be considered. In respect of an application made in 2009 (exh. MJD-27) for various projects which the Applicant says fall within situations for which funding will be or has been approved according to the ICU website, by letter dated 3.11.2009 the 2nd Respondent replied stating as follows:-
PERMOHONAN RM345,000.00 DARI PERUNTUKAN KAWASAN PARLIMEN SUNGAI SIPUT TAHUN 2009

Dengan hormatnya saya merujuk kepada Y.B. mengenai perkara di atas.
2. Dimaklumkan bahawa peruntukan untuk sumbangan kepada mangsa - mangsa bencana alam disalurkan apabila berlaku sesuatu bencana. Oleh yang demikian, YB disyorkan mengemukakan permohonan tersebut jika berlaku apa - apa bencana alam kepada Pejabat Daerah Sungai Siput atau Kuala Kangsar untuk diselaraskan supaya id tidak bertindih dengan sumbangan dari lain-lain jabatan dan agensi. Disamping itu, pejabat daerah juga telah diperuntukkan sejumlah RM30,000.00 setiap tahun untuk maksud yang sama.
3. Berkaitan dengan peruntukan untuk sekolah-sekolah iaitu Sekolah Gandhi, Dovenby, Shin Chung Secondary dan Sekolah Methodist, YB disyorkan untuk mengemukakan permohonan tersebut kepada Jabatan Pelajaran Negeri Perak untuk pertimbangan.
4. Bagi lain-lain permohonan seperti asrama anak yatim, subsidi bas sekolah, asrama orang tua, projek serta masalah di Kampung Orang Asli, kumpulan OKU serta projek membaiki dewan orang ramai, pejabat ini sekali lagi mencadangkan supaya permohonan-permohonan ini dikemukakan melalui pejabat daerah untuk diselaraskan dengan jabatan ini dan agensi yang berkaitan kerana peruntukan RM500,000.00 bagi tahun 2009 tidak dapat menampung semua keperluan dalam seluruh Kawasan Parlimen Sungai Siput.
Sekian, terima kasih.
The Applicant states that the projects for which he had applied for funds were the kind of projects for which funds from the Special Constituency Allocation are meant for. The 2nd Respondent did not respond to his request for an explanation.

[3] On 9.7.2010 the Applicant wrote to the 2nd Respondent to apply for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation for the year 2010 for various projects and activities (exh. MJD-30). The Applicant says that these projects and activities fall within the situations for which funding will be, and has been approved according to the 1st Respondent's website (exh. MJD-13), the written responses by the Prime Minister's Department in Parliament (exh. MJD-20, MJD-21, MJD-22, MJD-23 and MJD-24) and the 2nd Respondent's letter dated 19.10.2009 (exh. MJD-26). In reply by a letter dated 26.7.2010 (exh. MJD-31) the 2nd Respondent states as follows:-
PERMOHONAN RM650,000.00 DARI PERUNTUKAN KHAS KAWASAN PARLIMEN SUNGAI SIPUT UNTUK TAHUN 2010
Dengan hormatnya saya merujuk kepada surat Y.B. mengenai perkara di atas.
2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa sehingga 25 Julai 2010, 56 projek bernilai RM1.72 juta peruntukan khas ICU JPM telah diluluskan bagi kawasan Parlimen Sungai Siput, Sembilan (9) projek bernilai sebanyak RM1.15 juta sedang dilaksanakan, 47 projek bernilai RM561,865.15 telahpun siap dilaksanakan.
3. Permohonan Y.B. supaya sejumlah RM50,000.00 untuk mangsa-mangsa bencana alam disimpan di Pejabat Tanah tidak dapat dipertimbangkan kerana tiada peruntukan yang dikhaskan untuk disimpan di Pejabat Tanah. Y.B. dicadangkan mengemukakan senarai mangsa yang terlibat beserta laporan polis untuk dipertimbangkan supaya tidak bertindih dengan sumbangan dari agensi Kerajaan yang lain jika ada berlaku bencana alam.
4. Berkaitan cadangan Y.B. untuk perbelanjaan kepada pihak sekolah dan badan-badan disebutkan, Y.B. diminta mengemukakan senarai nama PIBG sekolah-sekolah yang berkenaan dan nama berdaftar badan-badan amal yang berkenaan serta butir-butir akaun bank untuk dipertimbangkan.
Sekian, terima kasih.
The Applicant states that he requested for clarification as to whether the 56 projects worth RM1.72 million were approved in 2010 only or since March 2008, and for details of the projects. He also provided the details requested by the 2nd Respondent. When the Applicant did not receive a response within a reasonable, he sent a letter dated 8.10.2010 to the 2nd Respondent stating that if he did not receive a response by 15.10.2010 he would assume that his application is rejected (exh. MJD-33).

[4] By letter dated 12.10.2010 (exh. MJD-34) the 2nd Respondent states as follows ('Written Decision'):-
PERMOHONAN RM650,000.00 DARI PERUNTUKAN KHAS KAWASAN PARLIMEN SUNGAI SIPUT UNTUK TAHUN 2010
Dengan hormatnya saya merujuk kepada perkara di atas.
2. Dimaklumkan bahawa sejumlah 56 tajuk telah diluluskan dalam tahun 2010 (sehingga 25hb Julai) di Kawasan Parlimen Sungai Siput melibatkan peruntukan berjumlah RM1.72 juta. Jumlah tersebut meliputi sumbangan, bekalan dan juga projek.
3. Untuk makluman Yang Berhormat, sumbangan yang diberikan merangkumi pemberian kepada pertubuhan serta persatuan seperti PIBG SMJK Shing Chung, PIBG Methodist dan Anak-Anak Yatim Nurul Ihsan sebagaimana yang tercatat dalam surat Yang Berhormat. Disamping itu, sekolah-sekolah Masyarakat Orang Asli seperti SK Pos Piah, SK Pos Perwor dan lain-lain serta juga Batin-Batin Orang Asli juga mendapat faedah dari sumbangan tersebut.
4. Memandangkan peruntukan yang terhad, maka pihak yang telah menerima sumbangan seperti yang disebutkan tidak akan dipertimbangkan manakala yang lain-lain akan diteliti keperluannya manakala projek-projek kecil di kawasan Orang Asli dinasihatkan supaya dikemukakan permohonan kepada Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli.
Sekian, terima kasih.
[5] The Applicant states that after receiving the 'Written Decision' dated 12.10.2010 above, he confirmed with the Principal of SMK Shin Chung, the Senior Assistant Principal of SMK Methodist and one Norhisan of the Nurul Ihsan Orphanage who informed him that they have not received any funds from the ICU or the 2nd Respondent in the course of year 2010. Therefore the Applicant says that the reasons given by the 2nd Respondent in the letter dated 12.10.2010 is false and incorrect. The Applicant states that the 'Written Decision' shows that funds from the Special Constituency Allocation seemed to have been given to SMK Shin Chung, SMK Methodist and Nurul Ihsan Orphanage through some other parties' application while his application was rejected.

[6] The Applicant contends that the Respondents or any of them has erred in law in the exercise of their discretion with regard to the administration and disbursement of the Special Constituency Allocation and has acted capriciously, with bias and/or for improper purpose, failed to take into account relevant factors and has taken into account irrelevant factors inter alia that the application was made by an Opposition Member of Parliament, in breach of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate or any reason for the 'Written Decision' and had made an irrational decision and manifestly unfair which no reasonable or sensible person or body of persons applying their mind to the question and/or acting in accordance with law and procedural propriety would have made.

[7] The Applicant states that he is also seeking orders from this court for disclosure and determination of the manner upon which the power and/or discretion vested in the Respondents (or any of them) is exercised. It is averred that it is necessary to compel the Respondents to show cause and give information as to their authority to exercise, vest and/or delegate the discretion to approve and disburse finds from the Special Constituency Allocation and to explain their respective roles and relationship in relation to one another. It is also necessary to compel the Respondents to specify the kinds of projects and activities for which application for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation will be granted, who can apply and all the conditions and criteria taken into consideration by the Respondents in granting funding applications for the Special Constituency Allocation as well as the time limits within which decisions on such applications must be made.

[8] Hence by way of enclosure 1 the Applicant applies for leave for judicial review for the following reliefs:-
(a) A writ of "quo warranto" be issued against the Respondents and each of them to show cause and give information as to their authority to exercise, vest and/or delegate the discretion to approve and disburse funds from the Federal Consolidated Funds which are allocated in the Federal Budget 2010 and any annual Federal Budget to the Prime Minister's Department (as "Peruntukkan Khas" or "Peruntukkan Khas Perdana Menteri untuk Kawasan Parlimen") for all parliamentary constituencies ("Special Constituency Allocation"), and to explain their respective roles and relationship in relation to one another;

(b) An Order of Mandamus to compel the Respondents and each of them to specify:-
(i) the kinds of projects and activities for which application for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation will be granted;
(ii) who can apply for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation;
(iii) all conditions and criteria taken into consideration by the Respondents in granting funding applications for the Special Constituency Allocation; and
(iv) the time limits within which decisions on applications for the Special Constituency Allocation will be made;
(c) A Declaration that, in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution, the Special Constituency Allocation must be provided and available to all Members of Parliament equally, that the power and discretion vested in the Respondents or any of them to approve applications for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation must be exercised equally and equitably amongst all Members of Parliament and all categories of applicants, regardless of political affiliations, and that the same criteria or conditions must be applied in considering all such applications;

(d) A Declaration that the decision of the 2nd Respondent set out in the 2nd Respondent's letter dated 12.10.2010 or any part thereof is a breach of Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution and as a result, unconstitutional and void;

(e) An Order of Certiorari to quash the decision of the 2nd Respondent as set out in the 2nd Respondent's letter dated 12.10.2010 or any part thereof, and consequently:-
(i) an Order of Mandamus to compel the Respondents or any of them to grant the Applicant's application vide his letter dated 09.07.2010 to the 2nd Respondent for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation for the Sungai Siput Parliamentary Constituency (P.62) for the year 2010; or
(ii) in the alternative, an Order of Mandamus to compel the Respondents to exercise their discretion to grant Applicant's application vide his letter dated 09.07.2010 to the 2nd Respondent for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation for the Sungai Siput Parliamentary Constituency (P.62) for the year 2010 in accordance with the guidelines and practice specified pursuant to prayer 2 above and Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution pursuant to prayer 3 above;
(f) An Order of Mandamus to compel the Respondents to specify:-
(i) all projects and activities for which application for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation has been granted since 2008 for the Sungai Siput Parliamentary Constituency (P.62);
(ii) the number of applications received, the persons or parties whose applications were approved and rejected and the persons or parties to whom the funds were disbursed for the applications that were approved vis a vis the Special Constituency Allocation since 2008 for the Sungai Siput Parliamentary Constituency (P.62); and
(iii) the time limits within which the applications for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation since 2008 for the Sungai Siput Parliamentary Constituency (P.62), were decided;
(g) Damages and/or punitive, aggravated and/or exemplary damages to be paid to the Applicant by the Respondents;

(h) An inquiry and/or at the Applicant's option an assessment of damages and/or punitive, aggravated and/or exemplary damages to be paid to the Applicant by the Respondents;
(i) Costs; and
(j) All necessary and consequential relief, orders and/or directions.
Grounds for application
[9] The grounds for the application are set out in paragraphs 48 to 63 of the Applicant's affidavit in support (enclosure 3). The Applicant avers that given that the Special Constituency Allocation utilizes public monies from the Federal Consolidated Fund, it is imperative for applicants of the said Fund and the public to know:-
(a) whether the Directors of the PPNs (such as the 2nd Respondent) or the Director-General of the ICU (the 1st Respondent) has the power or discretion to approve and disburse funds from the Special Constituency Allocation;
(b) how the abovementioned discretion is to be exercised, the conditions (if any) upon which it can be exercised, the time limit within which it must be exercised and who are the parties who can apply for funds from the Special Constituency Allocation;
(c) in respect of the 2nd Respondent's letter dated 12.10.2010 (exh. MJD- 34), the reason given for the said non-consideration/rejection is false or incorrect and the exercise of discretion by the 2nd Respondent was on a false premise as no such funds to the stated schools/organizations were allocated from the Special Constituency Allocation for Sungai Siput for the year 2010;
(d) the reason given by the 2nd Respondent contradicts the 2nd Respondent's response to the Applicant's previous applications in 2008 and 2009 and reveals that the Respondents or any of them exercised their discretion with regard to the administration and disbursement of the Special Constituency Allocation capriciously, with bias and/or improper purposes;
(e) in respect of the other projects applied for under the Applicant's 2010 application, the decision to "assess the necessity" of those projects instead of making a decision and approving them is an inordinate delay and therefore a failure to exercise the discretion conferred upon the Respondents. The decision is therefore indecisive, unjust and arbitrary;
(f) the Applicant has a legitimate expectation of receiving a decision from the Respondents or any of them for each and every one of the projects applied for within 7 days or at least within 30 days from receipt of the same;
(g) the Applicant's 2010 application ought to have been granted as the projects for which funds were applied for are projects of the kind for which funds from the Special Constituency Allocation are supposed to be granted and disbursed;
(h) the 2nd Respondent by the letter dated 26.7.2010 (exh. MJD-31) had signified/represented that the Applicant's 2010 application would be granted upon provision of details of the recipients/payment details requested by the 2nd Respondent. In the circumstances the Applicant has a legitimate expectation that the funds sought would be granted.
The objection
[10] The Attorney-General objects to the application for leave on the ground that there is no substance in the application and the application is an abuse of process. Briefly the objection is based on the following grounds:-
(a) Quo warranto:-
(i) Quo warranto is one of the prerogative writs used to challenge the appointment of a person who holds public office on the grounds that he is not qualified or there was a legal flaw in his appointment. This process is to determine whether he is entitled to hold the office and to discharge its functions;
(ii) there is nothing in the face of the Applicant's application that challenges the Respondents' qualification to hold public office or allege that there was some flaw in their appointments;
(iii) the Applicant is using the prerogative writ to elicit information that he has already sought to obtain as a Member of Parliament. This is evident from the queries in Parliament in Exhibits "MJD-4" - "MJD-7";
(b) Mandamus:-
(i) Order 53 r. 1(1) RHC 1980 provides that an application seeking the relief in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of judicature Act, 1964 which includes an application for an order of Mandamus is governed by Order 53 RHC, 1980;
(ii) Order 53 r. 1(2) RHC 1980 however provides that the same is subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII of Part 2 of the Specific Relief Act, 1950 which is on the performance of public duties.
(c) Declaration:-
(i) exhibit 'MJD-6' makes it clear that the Special Constituency Allocation ("the Allocation") is available for the 'rakyat' on application of not only Members of Parliament, irrespective of whether they are members of the ruling party or the opposition;
(ii) there is no basis to seek the court's intervention to declare something that is already clear.
(d) Certiorari and Mandamus
(i) the 2nd Respondent is tasked to exercise discretionary powers in considering applications for the use of the Allocation from various parties;
(ii) Mandamus is usually granted to compel the performance of a statutory duty by a public authority;
(iii) there is nothing in the Applicant's cause papers to suggest that the 2nd Respondent is acting pursuant to a statutory duty;
(iv) the use of the order of Mandamus to compel the 2nd Respondent to allow the Applicant's application will be contrary to the objective of the Allocation.
[11] Learned Senior Federal Counsel submits that the decision is based on policy considerations which is a management prerogative and therefore it is not reviewable by this Honourable Court (R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147; [1997] 1 MLJ 145; CCSU v. Minister of Civil Service [1994] 3 All ER 935; Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid bin Hj Mohd Noh [1997] 2 CLJ 11; [1997] 1 MLJ 789). It is submitted that this Honourable Court is in no position and not the proper forum to evaluate the qualifications or applications of the Special Constituency Allocation and to determine the policy. It requires a comprehensive process of evaluation by the 2nd Respondent which will also involve safeguarding of public interest and should only be exercised by a person who is qualified and as such these matters are best left in the hands of persons who have the responsibility upon it to ensure uniformity in the implementation of the said policy. As the decision is based on policy considerations which is the management prerogative, it is not reviewable by this court and the application is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. Learned Senior Federal Counsel further submits that the Special Constituency Allocation comes from the Federal Budget 2010 and it is now year 2011. At the end of the year the funds for 2010 are normally finalized and closed. Therefore this matter can be considered as being academic.
[12] For the Applicant learned counsel submits that the Attorney-General is in reality challenging the merits of the application as the Attorney-General is challenging the sufficiency of evidence, facts and law which should only done at the hearing of the substantive application. It is submitted that at the leave stage the Applicant need only show prima facie an arguable case and the application is not frivolous or vexatious. Thus the Applicant is only required to show that there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application. It is submitted that a perusal of the Applicant's affidavit in support shows not merely some substance in the grounds supporting the application but ample evidential support for the reliefs claimed. The Attorney-General's objections are not sufficient grounds to deny leave. It is further submitted that the Attorney-General has erroneously summarized the facts and the court must examine each and every allegation of fact and evidence for its veracity. On the issue of the relief of quo warranto it is submitted that the Applicant is challenging the Respondents' qualifications to hold office on the basis that there are conflicting statements as to their respective power and authority in disbursing the Special Constituency Allocation. On the issue of section 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 that the Applicant must bring himself within one of the grounds under the said section, it is submitted that in Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v. Liew Fook Chuan [1997] 1 CLJ 665 the Court of Appeal has dismissed the same objection.
Decision
[13] In considering this application I am guided by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Ta Wu Realty Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri & Anor [2008] 6 CLJ 235 where in his judgment Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA said as follows:-
Under O. 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, an applicant may procedurally seek out the reliefs specified at para 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, and for the purposes specified therein. Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 are the additional powers of the High Court, powers in addition to those already seised by it, to issue prerogative writs, wherein a High Court judge may issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas corpus, Mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or for any purpose. Section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, when read together with para. 1 of the Schedule, provides the High Court of that augmented power.
His Lordship said further:-
.... the Federal Court had approved the guidelines laid down in the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum [1990] COD 107 when considering the application of leave. The guidelines are as follows:-
(i) The judge should grant leave if it is clear that there is a point for further investigation on a full inter partes basis with all such evidence as is necessary on the facts and all such argument as is necessary on the law.
(ii) If the judge is satisfied that there is no arguable case he should dismiss the application for leave to move for judicial review.
(iii) If on considering the papers the judge comes to the conclusion that he really does not know whether there is or is not an arguable case, the right course is for the judge to invite the putative respondent to attend and make representations as to whether or not leave should be granted. That inter partes leave hearing should not be anywhere near so extensive as a full substantive judicial review hearing. The test to be applied by the judge at that inter paries leave hearing should be analogous to the approach adopted in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal against an arbitrator's award, ... namely: if, taking account of a brief argument on either side, the judge is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration, then he should grant leave.
In Chin Mee Keong & Ors v. Pesuruhjaya Sukan [2007] 5 CLJ 363 James Foong JCA (as His Lordship then was) said:-
At leave stage, which is the status of the appellants' application, Lord Diplock in IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 @ 643 said:-
The whole purpose of requiring that leave should first be obtained to make the application for judicial review would be defeated if the court were to go into the matter in any depth at that stage. If, on a quick perusal of the material then available, the court thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed, it ought, in the exercise of a judicial discretion to give him leave to apply for that relief.
[14] Learned Senior Federal Counsel submits that evaluation of the qualifications or applications of the Special Constituency Allocation is based on policy considerations and the court is not the proper forum to evaluate the qualifications or applications of the Special Constituency Allocation and to determine the policy which, being a management prerogative is not reviewable by the court. To my mind the exercise of discretion in the evaluation of the qualifications or applications of the Special Constituency Allocation may well be based on policy considerations within the management prerogative but the Applicant contends that the Respondents, in the exercise of discretion with regard to the administration and disbursement of the Special Constituency Allocation has acted capriciously, with bias and/or for improper purpose, has failed to take into account relevant factors and has taken into account irrelevant factors.
[15] I am of the view that the mere assertion that this is a matter of management prerogative and therefore not reviewable by the court is insufficient. It is a question of evidence. Even where the executive asserts that a particular decision is not susceptible to judicial review on the ground of national security, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in C.C.S.U. v. Minister for Civil Service (supra) said at p.402 as follows:-
The question is one of evidence. The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case is for the Government and not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the necessary information, and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security. But if the decision is successfully challenged, on the ground that it has been reached by a process which is unfair, then the Government is under an obligation to produce evidence that the decision was in fact based on grounds of national security.
In the same case Lord Roskill said at p.420 as follows:-
My Lords, the conflict between private rights and the rights of the state is not novel either in our political history or in our courts. Historically, at least since 1688, the courts have sought to present a barrier to inordinate claims by the executive. But they have also been obliged to recognize that in some fields that barrier must be lowered and that on occasions, albeit with reluctance, the courts must accept that the claims of executive power must take precedence over those of the individual. One such field is that of national security. The courts have long shown themselves sensitive to the assertion by the executive that considerations of national security must preclude judicial investigation of a particular individual grievance. But even in that field the courts will not act on a mere assertion that questions of national security were involved. Evidence is required that the decision under challenge was in fact founded on those grounds.
Further even in circumstances where it is submitted that the exercise of a power emanates from a royal prerogative, the judgment of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at page 398 shows that, while acknowledging that "within the sphere of its prerogative powers, the Crown has an absolute discretion", the case of Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] A.C. 508 shows that "the courts will inquire into whether a particular prerogative power exists or not, and, if it does exist, into its extent. But once the existence and the extent of a power are established to the satisfaction of the court, the court cannot inquire into the propriety of its exercise".
[16] I am conscious that there are limits to the court's inquiry through judicial review of certain executive actions. It is not for the courts to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in fulfillment of a policy is fair. The court is only concerned with the manner the decision had been taken. In C.C.S.U. at page 414-415 Lord Roskill, in reference to the duty to act fairly said as follows:-
But that latter phrase must not in its turn be misunderstood or misused. It is not for the courts to determine whether a particular policy or particular decisions taken in fulfillment of that policy are fair. They are only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken and the extent of the duty to act fairly will vary greatly from case to case ..... Many features will come into play including the nature of the decision and the relationship of those involved on either side before the decision was taken.
[17] Having considered the submissions of both the learned Senior Federal Counsel and learned counsel for the Applicant, I find that the Applicant has shown that there is a case fit for further consideration. I agree with learned counsel for the Applicant that there are issues that go to the merits of the application which ought to be resolved at the hearing of the substantive motion. For the reasons stated above I dismissed the objection by the Attorney General and allowed the application for leave. By consent there is no order as to costs.

Dated: 25/2/2011