I hope that within SEVEN(7) Days of the Pakatan Rakyat taking over the Federal Government, all those currently detained under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA), Emergency (Public Order and Prevention Crime) Ordinance 1969 (E(POPC)O) and Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (DD(SPM)A) be immediately released. I hope that the new government will not procrastinate ....or just keep these Detention Without Trial laws citing all kinds of reasons.
Some years ago, I wrote the following article which gives an overview about ISA and other laws that allow for Detention Without Trial, and I thought that now may be the time that some may be interested is knowing more about these laws - and understand WHY we need to immediately call for the repeal of the ISA and all those other laws that allow for Detention Without Trial...
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN MALAYSIA
– A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Preventive Detention by administrative power, as opposed to judicial detention, is defined as detention without judicial intervention or sanction. This form of detention, inter alia, may be due to detention by the police (executive) for purposes of investigation[1] and also for the purposes of preventing some supposed ‘crime’ which has not yet occurred (preventive detention). Preventive detention is commonly known as Detention Without Trial (‘DWT’).
In this report, we will not be considering Administrative Detention by the police for purposes of investigations prior to being charged but will be dealing only with Preventive Administrative Detention (Detention Without Trial (‘DWT’)).
When we talk about detention, we will not limit ourselves to the narrow interpretation which would only consider detentions of persons in prisons, lockups and/or detention centres. We will be looking at ‘detention’ from a broader interpretation which would include the imposition of any forms of restrictions and conditions on a person’s liberty without judicial intervention.
For a long time the word ‘Detention’ has had a narrow meaning, that is to only mean detention in prisons, police lockups and/or other detention centres.
Detention has to be redefined and given a broader interpretation that will include the imposition of restrictions and/or conditions on an individual’s freedom of movement, association, speech and expression. Restricting a person’s freedom of movement to the confines of a lockup or detention centre, and the restricting of a person’s movement to a specified area is no different except that in the former there are physical walls and ‘barbed wire’.
Specifically, when we talk about detention without trial, we should be talking about the meting out of punishment by the executive not the judiciary, irrespective if the said ‘punishment’ takes the form of detention in detention centres or the imposition of restrictions and/or conditions on a person’s movement and other freedoms.
An individual is ‘punished’ without the benefit of a fair and open trial. Many a time, these ‘punishments’ (hereinafter referred to as Detention Without Trial or ‘DWT’) are imposed and/or withdrawn at the discretion of one person, being the Minister (that is the Home Minister).
Laws that allow for DWT (or preventive detentions) have been amended so as to oust the jurisdiction of the courts to review this exercise of the Minister’s discretion. Only procedural aspects of the imposition of these detentions can be reviewed by the courts. The rationale for the ousting of judicial review could be drawn from the words of the Prime Minister when tabling the Internal Security (Amendment Act):
‘The interventionist role of judicial decisions and the trends of foreign courts should not be copied because such actions was against the concept of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary which was upheld in Malaysia. If the courts can reverse executive’s decision, it would make it impossible for the executive to make any decision for fear that the courts would intervene. The ruling party would then be waiting for the decisions of the courts and the results of appeal to higher courts’[2].
Administrative detention in Malaysia
In Malaysia, generally under the Criminal Procedure Code administrative detention is only allowed for a period not exceeding 24 hours after a person has been arrested.
Detention without trial (‘DWT’)
There exist four laws in Malaysia that allow for DWT and they are:
a) Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA);
b) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention Crime) Ordinance 1969 (E(POPC)O);
c) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (DD(SPM)A); and
d) Restricted Residence Act 1933.
As long as the Minister is satisfied
What the Minister needs to be satisfied with is illustrated below. Note that there is no mention of any requirement of evidence to be presented to the Minister, there is also no listing of matters that the Minister must consider before becoming ‘satisfied’. The discretion of the Minister could therefore be exercised arbitrarily.
‘If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a detention order) directing that that person be detained for any period not exceeding two years’. (s 8(1) Internal Security Act 1960)
‘If the Minister is satisfied that with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order it is necessary that that person should be detained, or that it is necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of crimes involving violence that that person should be detained, the Minister shall make an order (hereinafter referred to as a ‘detention order’) directing that that person be detained for a period not exceeding two years’. (s 4(1) Emergency (Public Order And Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969)
‘Whenever the Minister ... is satisfied with respect to any person that such person has been or is associated with any activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous drugs, the Minister may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public order that such person be detained, by order (hereinafter referred to as a ‘detention order’) direct that such person be detained for a period not exceeding two years’. (s 6(1) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985)
The provisions of the Restricted Residence Act 1933 are drafted in very wide terms. All that seems to be required is that there ‘are reasonable grounds for believing that any person should be required to reside in any particular area ...’. There is no mention about the reasons why such an order, take as for example the DD(SPM)A whereby it is stated that ‘such person has been or is associated with any activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous drugs ...’. Hence, the power accorded to the Minister under this Act is disturbingly excessive.
‘Whenever it shall appear to the Minister on such written information and after such enquiry as he may deem necessary that there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person should be required to reside in any particular area or be prohibited from entering into any particular area or areas the Minister may issue an order ...’ (s 2(1) Restricted Residence Act 1933)
With regards to arrest and detention, and the laws that provide for DWT, the police (and in the case of the ISA and the E(PCPO)O, any member of the security forces) may arrest without warrant. The arrest may be done if the said arresting officer has reasons to believe that there are grounds which would justify an issuance of a detention order/restriction order. An example of the provision that provides for arrest is as follows:
Provided that –
(a) he shall not be detained for more that 24 hours except with authority of a police officer of or above the rank of a Inspector;
(b) he shall not be detained for more than 48 hours except with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent; and
(c) he shall not be detained for more that 30 days[9] unless a police officer of or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported the circumstances of the arrest and detention to the Inspector General or to a police officer designated by the Inspector General in that behalf, who shall forthwith report the same to the Minister’. (s 73(3) Internal Security Act 1960)
During the period of the 60-day detention
During the 60-day period, the detainee does not have the right of access to his family, friends and even to his legal counsel. The police, even on inquiry by the family members, sometimes do not even confirm that the said person is in detention. The location of the detention is also not revealed to the family, friends and even legal counsel.
From the experiences of ex-detainees of DWT laws, it is said that during this period of detention, the detainee is subjected to interrogations and even torture, mentally and/or physically. Detainees have been subjected to solitary confinement, beatings with pieces of wood, stripping[10], etc. Below are extracts taken from sworn testimonies by four detainees who described their treatment in detention in the course of their application for a writ of habeas corpus. These extracts[11] should provide an idea of what happens to some during detentions.
‘During the first two weeks of my detention, I was interrogated very vigorously by Special Branch officers about my personal faith and my religious activities. I was not allowed sleep for days at a stretch and was warned that I would not get my food if I did not cooperate. One Inspector threatened to disturb my girlfriend ... On one occasion, I was knocked down to the ground and I injured my back. Since then, I have been passing blood in my urine and have suffered pain in my lower back constantly ... On one occasion, Inspector (name withheld) forced me to strip naked and enact the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. [He] also forced me to crawl on the floor in a naked state ...’.
‘The cell was windowless, the only ventilation being some holes in the upper portion of a wall. It was lit by a single light which was kept on all night ... For a full month ... my entire bedding was a thin plywood sheet on a cement slab. I was beaten with a stick about 1cm x 4cm x 120cm on my legs and the soles of my feet several times ... and was also slapped on the face with the back of my hand …’.
‘A police officer put fear in me ... by saying, ‘If I squeeze your balls, how long can you last?’ ... I was also subjected to the cold treatment during interrogations with very cold air directed through louvers onto my head causing me to shiver ... [i] experienced hallucinations and woke up in cold sweat. For two or three nights, I hallucinated that a big cobra was crawling beside me ... It was under such harsh and oppressive circumstances that I was requested to make statements...’.
‘I was forced to stand on a leg with arms outstretched and head bent backwards for long periods until I collapsed onto the floor ... Immediately I was kicked by the police officer to stand up again on one leg, and this was repeated many times ... I was forced to walk blindfolded towards the wall resulting in knocking myself against the wall and this was repeated many times. The police officers stamped on my toes and fingers causing excruciating and prolonged pains. I was subjected to the ‘cold treatment’ which consisted standing in front of a very cold air conditioner either naked or half naked several times ... and on one occasion the police officer had thrown cold water all over me ... I was forced to strip naked. A police officer ... rolled a bundle of newspapers, lit one end and threatened to burn my genitals [by] bringing the lighted end close to my genitals ... A police officer stated that he would ... make sexual advances to my wife ...’.
The detainee is also many a time alleged to have committed outrageous acts but since there will be no trial, these remain bare allegations. The detainee has no right to an open trial, let alone any trial at all. The police and/or the prosecution therefore do not need to produce any evidence, let alone prove the allegations to the usual standards of proof.
In the case of Dr Syed Husin Ali[12] who was detained for about six years, he was asked to admit that he was associated with the Communist Party of Malaysia and to implicate Dr Mahathir Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia. The Home Minister[13] at that time was Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie.
‘They wanted me to use the communist bogey on Mahathir and Musa [the then Deputy Prime Minister] ... they told me that I would be released if I implicated Mahathir and Musa. They slapped me, denied me sleep, spat in my face, told lies about my wife and even placed a pistol in front of me. It was a terrible lie and being a Muslim, I would not be part of it’[14].
Besides the Detention Order, the Restriction Order is an alternative DWT order available to the Minister under the ISA, E(POPC)O and the DD(SPM)A. In my opinion, this is a more repressive order, because a breach of the conditions or restrictions makes a person liable to a criminal offence which on conviction is punishable with imprisonment up to two years. The RRA only allows for the imposition of a Restriction Order.
To appreciate the kind of restrictions and conditions that can be imposed on a person subjected to a Restriction Order, s 8(5) ISA is set out below:
a) for imposing upon that person such restrictions as may be specified in the order in respect of his activities and his places of his residence and employment;
b) for prohibiting him from being out of doors between such hours as may be specified in the order, except under the authority of a written permit granted by such authority or persons as may be so specified;
c) for requiring him to notify his movements in such manner at such times to such authority or persons as may be specified in the order;
d) for prohibiting him from addressing public meetings or from holding office in, or taking part in the activities of or acting as adviser to, any organisations or association, or from taking part in any political activities; and
e) for prohibiting him from travelling beyond the limits of Malaysia or any part thereof specified in the order except in accordance with permission given to him by such authority as may be specified in such order.’ (s 8(5) Internal Security Act 1960)
a) that he shall be subject to the supervision of the Police for any period not exceeding two years;
b) that he shall reside within the limits of any State, districts, mukim, town or village specified in the restriction order;
c) that he shall not transfer his residence to any other State, district, mukim, town or village, as the case may be, without the written authority of the Chief Police Officer of any State concerned;
d) that except so far as may be otherwise provided by the restriction order, he shall not leave the State, district, mukim, town or village within which he resides without the written authority of the Chief Police Officer of the State concerned;
e) that he shall at all times keep the Officer in Charge of the Police District in which he resides notified of the house or place in which he resides;
f) that he shall be liable, at such times or times as may be specified in the restriction order to present himself at the nearest police station;
g) that he shall remain within doors, or within such area as may be defined in the restriction order, between such hours as may be specified in the restriction order, unless he obtains special permission to the contrary from the Officer in Charge of the Police District;
h) that except in so far as may be otherwise provided by the restriction order, he shall not enter any State, district, mukim, town or village specified in the restriction order;
i) that he shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour;
j) that he shall enter into a bond, with or without sureties as the Minister may direct and in such amount as may be specified in the restriction order, for his due compliance with the restrictions and conditions imposed on him by the restriction order. (s 4A, Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance[17])
As was mentioned earlier, a contravention of a restriction or condition would result in a commission of an offence, and if this contravention is proved, the said person ‘shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and not less than two years’[18] under the E(POPC)O. Under the DD(SPM)A, he can ‘be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and not less than three years’[19].
This third kind of Order is provided by s 4B E(POPC)O[20] and a reading of this section as set out below is sufficient to understand this kind of order.
‘The Minister may at any time direct that the operation of any detention order be suspended subject to all or any of the restrictions and conditions he is empowered to impose by a restriction order ...’ (s 4B Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance).
Detention Orders are provided for under the ISA, E(POPC)O and the DD(SPM)A and as mentioned above, all that is needed before a Detention Order is made is that the Minister must be satisfied of certain matters. The words used in describing these matters are so wide, that any mildly creative individual could ensure that satisfaction is achieved.
Detention Centres
The detainee will be placed in Detention Centres and this detention will be governed by the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960[24].
A perusal of these rules seem to imply that there are two kinds of detention camps, namely the ordinary detention camp and the special detention camp[25]. The rights and privileges of the detainee varies depending on the kind of camp that he is placed in.
Judicial Review or Judicial Intervention
Section 8A further limits this, and the said section is laid out as follows:
‘No detention order shall be invalid or inoperative by reason –
(a) that the person to whom it relates –
(i) was immediately after the making of the detention order detained in any place other than a place of detention referred to in section 8(3);
(ii) continued to be detained immediately after the making of the detention order in the place in which he was detained under section 73 before his removal to a place of detention referred to in section 8(3), notwithstanding that the maximum period of such detention under section 73(3) had expired; or
(iii) was during the duration of the detention order on journey in police custody to a place of detention referred to in section 8(3); or
(b) that the detention order was served on him at any place other than the place of detention referred to in section 8(3),
An analysis of the applications of judicial review reveals that the mode used has generally been by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia (Federal Court, 25 April 1969) (1969) 2 MLJ 129: ‘whether there was reasonable cause to detain a person under Section 8(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 [ISA] was a matter of opinion and policy, a decision on which could only be taken by the executive, and which therefore the courts could not go into ...’
Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Raja Harun; Inspector-General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun (Supreme Court) (1988) 1 MLJ 182): ‘the detaining authorities are not obliged to disclose the facts which led them to so believe nor are they required to prove in court the sufficiency or adequacy of the reasons for such belief in any proceedings for habeas corpus instituted by the detainee. It is sufficient if the detaining authorities show that the person has been detained in exercise of a valid legal power. The onus is then on the detainee to show that the power has been exercised mala fide or improperly or for a collateral or ulterior purpose ...’. It was also held that ‘where the detaining authorities invoke national security as the grounds for non-disclosure of facts leading to the making of an order of detention, the test to be applied by the court in any proceedings for habeas corpus would be a subjective test. The court cannot in those circumstances compel the disclosure of such facts.’
Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh (Supreme Court) (1988) 3 MLJ 29: ‘... while the grounds of detention stated in the order of detention were open to judicial review, the allegations of fact upon which the subjective satisfaction of detaining authority was based were immune from judicial scrutiny ...’.
Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police (Supreme Court) (1988) 1 MLJ 293: ‘police power of arrest and detention under Section 73 of the ISA could not be separated from the ministerial power to issue an order of detention under Section 8 thereof ...’. It was also held that ‘in the matter of preventive detention the executive alone is the best judge and that the court will not be in a position to review the fairness of the executive’s decision-making process having regard to the Constitutional bar on disclosure of the relevant information by the executive’. This case also held that ‘the ISA was a valid piece of legislation and that there was nothing in the wording of the Act to show that its operation was restricted to persons suspected of communist activities’.
However in the case of Karpal Singh, he was successful in his application for a writ of habeas corpus, and was released by the court only to be subsequently re-arrested again under the ISA. This indicates that a successful judicial review may not be sufficient, as these laws that allow for DWT can be used again to arrest and detain again.
Recently, in the Federal Court case of Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor –v- Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals (2002) 4 CLJ 309, the court looking at the period of administrative detention by the police, being the period prior to the issuance of the Detention Orders by the Minister, held that the court is entitled to review the sufficiency and the reasonableness of the respondent’s [i.e. the Police] reasons for believing that there were grounds to justify the appellants’ detention under s.8 ISA and that the appellant had acted or was about or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the nation. The court said that the objective test, and not the subjective test, applies and what this means is that the court would now look and see whether a reasonable police officer would in that particular situation have arrested and detained the said detainee. In this case, interestingly, the court did not just consider the facts that existed prior to the arrest, but also went on to considered what happened after the arrest during the period of detention, to determine the real reasons for the arrest and detention. This case was concerning the ISA, and logically it should also apply to other detention without trial laws.
According to the DWT, there are provisions for the setting up of an Advisory Board whose function is to review every order or direction made or given by the Minister not less than once every six months but sad to say that all that they are empowered to do after that is to ‘submit to the Minister a written report ..., and may make therein such recommendations as it shall think fit’[33].
In the case of DD(SPM)A[34], the detainee has more explicit rights[35], like the right to be informed of his right to make representations, and if he chooses to do so, the Advisory Board shall sit within three months[36] from the date of receipt of the said representations. There is also similar provision where every order and/or direction be reviewed not earlier than 12 months from the date of such order/direction[37]. Here, the opinion of the Advisory Board carries more ‘weight as seen in s 11(3)[38] which is set out below:
Only at the Extraordinary General Meeting in 1998 did the Malaysian Bar adopt a similar position. The Malaysian Bar has now in July 2002 set up a Special Task Force to campaign for the repeal of all preventive detention laws.
The campaign against preventive detention or DWT laws in Malaysia has made slow progress and this is primarily due to the lack of awareness or conscientisation.
The ISA that was originally enacted against persons suspected of communist activities[39] has been used increasingly against political and/or personal opponents by those in power.
Similarly, the E(POPC)O was supposed to be used to suppress gang-related crimes and crimes of violence, but past experience has shown that it has been used against workers’ leaders as well.
The DD(SPM)A is supposed to be used as a weapon to combat the offence of drug trafficking but alas, there is always the room for abuse, for after all a person arrested, detained or restricted under any of these DWT laws do not have the just access to a fair and open trial.
But irrespective of its stated purposes, all these laws that allow for DWT, can be abused. These laws, which goes against principles of natural justice and human rights must be repealed. Judicial review should be revived for these laws, giving effect to the doctrine of separation of powers, so that at least the judiciary will be able to check any mis-use of these laws, at least until it is abolished in toto. All actions of the executive, be it the police and/or the Minister, should be subject to judicial review and it is most important that there be no exceptions.
Charles Hector
*Advocate & Solicitor, High Court of Malaya.
[1] Art 5(2) Federal Constitution allows the police to arrest and detain a person (a citizen) for a period of less than 24 hours.
[2] Extracted from a paper by Karpal Singh entitled ‘Administrative Detention in Malaysia’.
[3] Referring to the Restricted Residence Act 1933 which gives very broad powers to the Minister to restrict residence and/or inhibit movement if ‘… there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person should be required to ...’ (see s 2(i) of the Act). This Act unlike the other laws that allow preventive detentions does not specify any grounds or reasons why a person should be so restricted and/or inhibited. The Internal Security Act 1960 for example, allows for preventive detentions if, and only if, the Minister is satisfied that it is ‘... necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof ...’.
In the case of Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia (1977) 2 MLJ 187, the appellant had been arrested under a warrant issued under the provisions of the Restricted Residence Act 1933, and thereafter he was not produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours as required by Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution. Before the appeal was heard by the Federal Court, the Federal Constitution was amended whereby Article 5(4) was amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1976, and declared not to ‘apply to the arrest and detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence’. This amendment was backdated to 31 August 1957, the Independence Day of Malaysia (Dato’ Dr Rais Yatim, Detention Without Trial: Has The Time For Abolition Come?).
[4] In this case, the proviso itself clearly states that the words ‘within twenty four hours’ is replaced with the words ‘within fourteen days’. The application of this can be seen in the Immigration Act 1959/63 (see s 51(5)(b)).
[5] Non-Governmental Organisations.
[6] The Malaysian Bar issued a statement condemning this act, which was published in The Star (8 August 2002) in a report entitled ‘Bar: Police wrong to re-arrest freed men’.
[7] * Section 8B, Internal Security Act 1960 (s 8B, amongst others, was inserted by the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A739) which came into effect on 24 August 1989).
* Section 7C, Emergency (Public Order & Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (inserted by the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A740) which came into effect on 24 August 1989).
* Section 11C, Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (s 11C, amongst others, was inserted by Act A738 around the same time as the two above).
[8] The provisions for the 60-day detention period is similar in all the laws that provide for DWT.
[9] With regard to the Dangerous Drugs (SPM)A, the word ‘thirty days’ is replaced by the words ‘fourteen days’.
[10] The case of Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia should also be considered.
[11] Malaysia: ‘Operation Lallang’: Detention Without Trial Under the Internal Security Act – Amnesty International (December 1988), Preventive Detention (Restrictions) Laws In Malaysia – an article that was published in ALIRAN on or about December 1994.
[12] Mentioned by Dr Syed Husin in many of his discussions. He has documented his experiences in detention under the ISA in a recently published book entitled Two Faces.
[13] Thereafter, I believe that the position of the Home Minister has been held by the Prime Minister, until this year Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the new Deputy Prime Minister has taken over this portfolio.
[14] Jocelin Tan, ‘An Old Warrior’, Malaysian Business, 1 June 1994, p 34. Dr Syed Husin Ali, now the President of Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) was an ISA detainee for six years (1974-1980). After the 60-day detention period, he was also subject to re-interrogation after being sent to the Kamunting Detention Camp. Usually, after the first 60-days, detainees are no more subjected to interrogations by the police. (Also see Dato’ Dr Rais Yatim, Detention Without Trial: The Malaysian Experience).
[15] This information and the condition of many others who have been detained under the ISA can easily be obtained on the Internet.
[16] Sentence of Police Supervision and the obligations of persons subject to supervision are probably the same as those provided in s 295 and s 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[17] Similar provision as s 6(3) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[18] Section 4A(4) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance.
[19] Section 6(7) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[20] Also see s 10 Internal Security Act.
[21] Section 8(1) Internal Security Act, s 4(1) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, s 7(1) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[22] Section 8(7) Internal Security Act, s 7A Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, s 11A Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[23] R Gunaratnam, a Party Rakyat Malaya member, was detained for 11 years 8 months beginning from 14 November 1970 until 1982. S N Rajah, the executive secretary to United Malayan Estate Workers (UMEW) was detained for 11 years 2 months, beginning on 16 November 1970 until 18 January 1981.
[24] Section 8(4) Internal Security Act 1960, s 4(3) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance also provides specifically that the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 shall apply to every palace of detention and persons detained under this Ordinance.
[25] Rule 86 Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960, also see Rule 2 which gives the definition of ‘special detention camp’ as meaning a place declared to be a special detention camp under Rule 86.
[26] Would also be similar for detainees kept in special detention camps who have been promoted to the Third Stage.
[27] Rule 81 Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960.
[28] Section 8B Internal Security Act 1960 (s 8B, amongst others, was inserted by the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A739) which came into effect on 24 August 1989). Section 7C Emergency (Public Order & Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (inserted by the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A740) which came into effect on 24 August 1989). Section 11C Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985, (s 11C, amongst others, was inserted by Act A738 around the same time as the two above).
[29] Extracted from a paper by Karpal Singh entitled ‘Administrative Detention in Malaysia’.
[30] Section 11D Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act, s 7D Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance.
[31] Section 11C Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act, s 7C Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance.
[32] Section 11E Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act, s 7E Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance.
[33] Section 13 Internal Security Act.
[34] Similar provisions found in the E(POPC)O but the powers of the Board recommendations seems to be less or more like the ISA. The frequency of a review/order is also not stated and is left to the discretion of the Chairman of the Advisory Board (s 7(1) E(POPC)O).
[35] Section 9 Dangerous Drugs(Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[36] Section 10 Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[37] Section 11 Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[38] See also s 11(4) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act.
[39] Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police (Supreme Court) (1988) 1 MLJ 293. This case also held that ‘the ISA was a valid piece of legislation and that there was nothing in the wording of the Act to show that its operation was restricted to persons suspected of communist activities’.
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1 comment:
Thanks for putting up this useful document.
I was just checking around the web for such a document to help one understand better the ISA.
It is rather long to read on the web. If you don't mind my suggesting, the document will be much more readable if it can be downloaded as a file (pdf format perhaps).
In any case, thanks.
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